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市民参加：
そのパターンと政治的環境
高橋和夫・田総恵子
要
?
　　本論では，ある国の政治参加のパタ「ンは，参加者側の要因だけではなく，制度的’
要因にも木さく影響されるという仮説に基づき・目本の政治参加について考えて点る・
特に考察の中心となるのは，市民運動のような新しい型の政治参加である．
　　まず1最近の政治学の傾向である，日本政治の多元主義的評価を紹介し，その批判
を試みる。ここでは，「非‘政策決定」，権力の二面性という考え方を，批判の論拠とす・
る．多元主義理論に対しては，既に政箪濠定の場に上った問題しか対象にせず，そζに
到達する以前につぶされてしまった問題に関心を向けない，乏いう反論がピれまでもな
されてきた．また「非・政策決定」理論の方にも，実証のむずかしさという弱点がある．
　　この弱点を矯正し，理論の実証性を高めるために，「制度による政治問題の選択，
あるいは，．よりわけ」という考え方が登場した■．本論ではζの中でも特に，行政上の手
続きにおける選択に注目して，実証分析を試みた．取り上げたのは原子力エネルギー問
題である．原子力については，事故の危険性などから，不安を感じている国民の多いこ：
とが世論調査にも表れている．にもQ・かわらず，原子ヵを基軸エネルギーにしょケとす
る政府の政策が変翼される気配はない．このギャップに，原子力政策が政治問題化して
いないことの表れであり）’政治問題とならないのば，制度による選択が行われているか
らではないか，と考えて，原子力行政の問題点を指摘してみた．
　　最後に，そうした行政のあり方が反原子力を訴える運動の活動パターンに影響し，
日本の場合，運動の政治的影響力を弱めていることに言及する，政治参加が制度的要因
に左右されることの一つの例としたい．
IRtroductieR
　　This　paper　is　a　part　of　an・attempt　to　see　whether・・a　structdre　of　political　deci－
sionmaking　inHuences　the　pattern　bf　pUblic　participation；studies　haveまンeen　made
about　who　participates　and　why，　but　how　people　participate・　is　Usu’allY”　of　secondarY’
interest，　and　explained　by　attributes　of　participants　like　their　repertoires　and
av・i1・bl・・e・・u・ce・・Publi・p・・tゆ・ti・n・h・甲ev…ヰS　n・t　f・ee　f・・m　in・tituti・n・1
constraints，　even　when　it　takes　the　form’　of　unconventional　participation．　lt　is
especially　true　for　public　participatien　in　highly　institutionalized　political　system　in
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which　mediation　between　state　and　society　is　regulated　and　deviation　is　considered
to　be　an　unusual　event　to　be　avoided．
　　　　Policymaking　is，　therefore，　designed　to　preclude　such　events　in　consideration　of
uninterrupted　policy　formulation　and　implementation　；　it　is　accomplished　by　anticipa－
tion　and　exclusioni）．　Anticipation　is　to　coopt　as　many　actors　as　possible　who　are
anticipated　to　be　affected　by　a　policy　under　discussion，　so　that　possible　problems　are
dealt　with　in　advance．　Exclusion，　en　the　other　hand，　is　to　reject　access　to　policymak－
ing　to　those　who　make　uncompromising　demands．　We　think　that　it　greatly　matters
to　the　pattern　of　public　participatien　which　tactics　is　preferably　adepted．
　　　With　this　basic　hypothesis　in　mind，　we　will　examine　a　case　of　Japan　in　this
paper，　with　critical　examination　of　recent　pluralist　literature　about　Japanese
political　system．
1．　Query
　　　The　first　query　of　this　paper　is　whether　Japanese　political　system　is　so　pluralistic
as　recent　scholars　insist　in　their　arguments　on　power－shift　between　the　ruling　Liberal
Dernocratic　Party　and　bureaucracy．　The　Japanese　system．may　have　become　more
pluralistic　than　before；　yet　we　argue　that　its　extent　of　pluralism　is　still　limited，
especially　in　the　field　of　dealing　with　unconventional　public　participation，　i．e．，
citizens’　movements　which　have　appeared　in　Japanese　political　scenes　since　the　late
1960’s．
　　　　Pluralist　scholars　have　some　reservations　to　call　Japanese　system　unconditionaily
’pluralist’；　they　add　special　qualifications　to　the　term　such　as　’patterned’，　or
’bureaucratic　inclusionary　’．　We　stress　these　conditions，　and　presume　that　Japanese
political　system　maintains　a　relatively　closed　policymaking　strueture，　although　with
modification　over　time，　and　there　remain　actors　who　have　yet　to　be　’patterned’
in　or　”included　’　in　political　discussions．
　　　In　this　paper，　we　will　first　review　the　recent　pluralist　literature，　and　then
present　some　critical　comment　with　suggestions　for　studying　the　limitation　of　a
pluralist　political　system．　ln　the　next　section，　we　will　specifically　ask，　as　the　second
query，　in　what　aspect　Japanese　political　system　is　less　pluralistic，　and　study　a　case
of　formulation　and　implementatien　of　nuclear　energy　policy．　Finally，　we　will　try　to
see　whether　any　pattern　can　be　found　in　the　relation　between　a　political　system
and　public　participation．
IX．　Pluralist　Arguments
Japanese　pluralist　system　is　called　by　many　names　：　’　bureaucratic－inclusioltay
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pluralism　’，　’　admiRistrative　or　patterned　pluralism　’，　’　compartmentalized　pluralism・’，
and　’　referent　pluralism　’．　Whatever　the　adjective　is，　they　refer　to　certain　features　of
Japanese　political　system，　which　are　summarized　as　follows　；
（1）　the　LDP　pariiamentarians　have　developed　stronger　influence　in　policymaking
process　for　the　last　decade；
（2）　bureaucrats　retain　unusual　degree　ef　influence　in　policymaking　process，　compared
with　other　pluralist　systems　；
（3）　parliarnentarians　and　bureaucrats　are　in　close　cooperation，　and　the　parliament－
arians　’　intervention　to　administrative　process　is　institutionalized　；
（4）　increasing　infiuence　of　parliamentarians　is　a　result　of　growing　importance　of　the
LDP’s　policy　affairs　research　councils　（PARCs）　and　’　zoku　’　paliarnentarians　；
（s）　bureaucrats　piay　a　crucial　role　in　mediating　between　state　and　society，　by　repre－
senting　social　interest　in　political　arena．
　　　　Different　features　of　Japanese　pluralist　system　are　ercphasized　in　different　defini－
tions．　For　example，　’bureaucratic－inclusionary　pluralism’　is　applied　to　describe
relations　betweeR　state　and　society　；　it　is　a　political　system　in　which　representation
of　the　public　interest　i＄　a　bureaucratic　task，　and　relationships　among　political　actors
are　characterized　by　horizontal　mobility　rather　than　a　fixed　hierarchical　order2）　．
　　　　’　Administrative　or　patterned　pluralism　’　is　a　political　system　of　which　policymak－
ing　process　is　governed　mostly　by　the　better　organized　and　routine　procedure　of
bureaucratic　rule　；　changing　and　inconsistent　demands　presented　by　representatives
are　not　to　prevai13）．　Bureaucrats，　then，　try　to　align　themselves　with　relevent　pressure
groups　in　order　to　strengthen　their　bargaining　power　；　bureaucracy　is　now　a　political
actor　with　independent　source　of　power．　Muramatsu　calls　it　’　the　political　bureaucra－
cy　’．　Pressure　groups　are　therefore　organized　according　to　bureaucratic　jurisdiction．
In　his　analysis，　patterRed　are　not　only　policymaking　processes　but　also　relationships
between　state　and　social　interest．
　　　　’　CompartmeRtalized　pluralism　’　is　defined　as　“　the　system　in　which　the　roles　of
the　domlnant　party　politicians　and　bureaucrats　are　indistinguishable　；　the　level　of
integrity　at　the　center　of　power　is　relatively　low；　and　the　relationship　between
interest　groups　and　the　bureaucrat－LDP　complex　is　stable4）”．　Here　emphasis　is　on
confiicts　within　the　ruling　coalition　and　the　grewing　importance　of　the　LDP・　in　the
coaltion．　Relatienship　between　the　ruling　coalition　and　secial　interest　is　again　con－
sidered　to　be　strong　and　stable，　and　’　compartmentalized　’　by　ministerial　division．
　　　　Finally　’　referent　pluralism　’　iRtroduces　another　actor　in　Japanese　political　sys－
tem　：　mass　media5）．　While　the　three　previous　definitions　stress　the　inner　workings　of
the　ruling　bureaucrat－LDP　coalition　and　the　corresponding　organization　of　social
interest，　referent　pluralism　emphasizes　the　social　infiueRce　structure　which　promotes
pluralistlc　tendency．　Mass　media，　with　thelr　pewer　to　“　refer　to　people　te　selected
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images　and　symbols，　and　to　cause　them　to　identify　with　certain　groups　and　ideas
whi¢h　carry　political　implications　”，　is　the　major　promoter　of　referent　pluralism．　This
pluralism　then　helps　“　generate　popular　opinien　and　social　movements　with－which
the　（ruling）　Triumvirate　must　coRtend6）　”．
III．　Counterargument
III．1．　ConventieRal　vs．　URconventional　Policymaking
　　　　The　four　pluralist　analyses　are　mostly　based　on　observation　of　conventional　policy－
making　processes．　lt　is　largely　the　case　in　most　pluralist　studies；　what　they
describe　is　the　ordinary　state　of　political　dynamics．．’Conventional’　politics　in　ad－
vanced　industrial　democracies　usually　involves　policies　distributing　governmental
wealth　and　services，　therefore　Japanese　pluralist　studies　tend　to　choose　issues　such
as　agricultural　subsidies　and　public　enterprises．　The　choice　may　be　plausible，　but
it　is　also　limiting　the　scope　of　aRalysis．
　　　　Japanese　pelitics　has　a　different　kind　of　agenda　：　national　defence，　the　Constitu－
tional　revision，　the　YasukuRi　Shrine，　and　such．　These　issues　may　not　be　constantly
debated，　but　when　they　are，　the　debate　gathers　attention　from　outside　the　’　conven－
tional　’　policymaking　community．　lntellectuals，　opposition　parties，　and　ideological
organizations，　who　are　not　usually　active　in　the　polity，　participate　in　the　discussion．
　　　　Only　Muramatsu　mentions　the　’　ideology　’　process　distiRguished　from　the　ordinary
policy　process；　yet　he　dismisses　it　as　a　process　to　be　avoided　to　maintain　a　stable
political　system　aRd　to　be　absolved　by　bureaucratic　efforts　not　to　let　issues　escape
from　their　jurisdiction7）　．
　　　Neglecting　unconventional　issues　as　not　constituting　the　large　part　of　JapaRese
policymakiRg　system　makes　the　pluralist　studies　only　partially　plausible　as　a　descrip－
tion　of　Japanese　politics．　Response　of　the　pluralist　system　to　unconventiokal　political
situation　should　be　studied　in　order　to　examine　the　exteRt　of　pluralistic’　features　of
Japanese　politics．
HI．2．　Pluralist　vs．　Participatory　Democracy
　　　Pluralist　approach　in　general　has　been　criticized　for’its　limited　choice　ef　case
studies　and　its　tendency　not　to　question　the　existiRg　pewer　relationship．　The　classic
confiict　between　pluralist　and　elitist　studies　has　been　waged　over　whether　the　theory
is　empirically　tenable　；　pluralists　argue　that　elitists　（theorists）　suspect　conspiracy
behind　every　policymaking，　which　cannot　be　empirically　exaMiR’ed　except　for　identi－
fication　of　elite　membership　by　reputational　analyses　；　elitists　insist　that　pluralists
take　community　pewer　relationship　for　granted　and　only　see　the　surface，　in　which
plural　numbers　of　yet　elite　interact．
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　　　　Since　pluralists　put　emphasis　oit　empiricism　and　select　issues　already　on　political
agenda　for　case　studies，　they　tend　to　limit　the　sphere　of　politics　to　institutional　pro－
cess　and　separate　it　from　social　in舳ences．　Elitists，　orしthe　other　ha簸d，　consider　power
relationship　important　for　understanding　political　dynamics　and　try　to　link　politics
and　social　（and　economic）　relatienship．　ln　elitist　argument，　political　process　takes
place　not　only　in　political　institutions　but　also　in　social　relations．
　　　　Pluralist　criticism　to　elitist　analysis　is　verified　；　it　is　indeed　difficult　to　present
case　studies　in　which　such　elite　exerts　power　covertly　as　well　as　overtly　to　enferce
their　will．　Especially　covert　influence，　which　elitists　regard　the　most　effective
weapon，　poses　dithculty　in　empirical　research．　However，　what　cannot　be　seen　some－
times　does　exist．；　they　sheuld　not　be　neglected　because　ef　invisibility．
　　　　Kabashima　and　Broadbent　have　enhanced　the　scope　of　analysis．　ln　an　infiuence
structure　model　they　constructed　from　survey　data，　they　identify　the　importance　of
mass　media，　which　seems　to　have　been　unduly　neglected．　Although　mass　media　is
loca’ted　outside　of　the　’　polity　’，　they　are　coRsidered　by　both　themselves　and　others　to
exert　strong　infiuence　upon　the　LDP　and　・bureaucracy．　Their　task　is　to　give　counter－
elite　new　potent　resources　by　redistributing　“　emotionally　meaningful　symbols　and
eveRt8）”．　Media，　therefore，　comprise　a　new　form　of　political　resources，　which　may　be
more　beneficial　to　power　challengers　than　power　contenders．
　　　　However，　the　model　indicates　another　interesting　feattire　of　Japanese　political
system9）．　Citizens’　movemeitt　groups　iR　this　model　have　only　one　identifiable　chanRel
to　infiuence　the　polity，　i．e．，　that　through　the　use　of　mass　media．　Media　is　indeed
more　sympathetic　to　socially　disadvantaged　groups，　but　if　those　who　are　underprivi－
leged　are　represented　in　the　polity　only　through　naedia’s　referent　power　as　a　reference
to　policymaking，　the　disadvantaged・　might　have　to　totally　rely　on　mass　media　in
order　to　have　their　demand　ful創1ed．
　　　　By　expanding　the　・scope　of　analysis　to　the　outside　of　the　polity，　the　referent
pluralism　indeed　allows　possibilities　for　political　process　to　be　carried　out　in　the
social　relationship．　However，　they　do　not　adequately　define　the　extent　of　referent
pluralism，　by　neglecting　a　political　impact　of　inequality　in　infiuence　relationship．　lf
mass　media　is　the　only　channel　for　citizens’　movement　groups　to　be　referred　to　the
polity，　media　becomes　the　double－edged　sword　for　them；　they　can　promote　the
groups’　interest　by　reporting　it，　but　they　can　also　suppress　it　by　ignoring　it．
　　　　The　concept　of　’　non－decision　making　’　is　introduced　from　the　aspect　of　participa－
tory　democracy，　to　provide　a　theoretical　framework　for　studying　the　covert　exercise
of　infiuence　to　prevent　issues　from　becoming　a　political　problemiO＞．　Potential　issues
here　are　defined　as　those　which　may　challenge　or　change　the　existing　social　order　aRd
upset　the　ruling　elite　coalition．　Such　issues　tend　to　be　oriented　toward　the　unorgan－
ized，　the　socially　disadvantaged．　or　those　who　have　not　been　regular　participants　in
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the　political　process．　These　peopie’s　interest　is　neglected　due　to　the　ru1ing　cealitiofi’s
’　non－decision　making　’　power　which　prevents　it　from　derr｝andiRg　political　solution．
Poverty　problem　of　black　peop｝e　in　the　1950’s　is　cited　as　an　example，　as　well　as　pollu－
tion　in　the　1970’sii）．
　　　　From　sociological　redefinition　of　power　as　having　two　effects，　one　of　which　is
exercized　when　forcing　others　to　do　what　one　wishes　them　to　do，　and　the　other　of
which　is　exercized　when　forcing　others　not　to　do　what　one　wishes　them　not　to　do，　the
concept　of　non－decision　making　is　thus　introduced　to　political　analyses．　Claus　Offe，
recogniziRg　the　two　faces　of　power，　argues　that　a　political　system　has　a　certain　built－
in　mechanism　to　regulate　political　agenda’2）．　Selection，　er　filtering，　of　issues，　as　he
calls　it，　is　performed　in　four　levels　of　a　political　system　；　structural，　ideological，
procedural　and　repressive　levels．　ln　his　arguncent，　he　particularly　refers　to　structural
problems　of　the　capitalist　state．
　　　　Structual　seiectiveness　is　established　de　jure　and　de　f’acto，　giving　a　political
system　a　defiRite　course　of　action　；　the　guarantee　of　private　property　is　the　obvious
example　of　policies　to　be　dealt　with　by　state　policies．　Other　de　facto　limits　are　marked
by　“　the　restricted　availablity　of　rr｝aterial　resources　and　information　”，　and　also　by
“　the　existence　and　the　effectiveness　of　bureaucratic　organizations’3）　”．
　　　　Even　the　most　flexible　system　cannot　escape　the　iRfluence　of　ideological－cultural
norms；　the　repressiveness　of　the　system　of　norms　in　a　society　makes　difference　by
defining　the　objectives　of　state　policies．　Procedural　selectiveness　is　more　concreteiy
defined，　and　will　be　the　central　concern　of　our　empirical　analysis．　SelectioR　takes
place　in　“　formal　rule　structures　determining　the　process　of　parliamentary　consulta－
tion，　collective　bargaining，　bureaucratic　planning　and　administration，　policy－discus－
sien　by　academic　experts，　election　campaigns　and　political　mass－comrnunicationi‘）”．
Offe　argues　that；
　　　　“　（these　procedures）　are　never　mere　procedural　formalisms　but　they　predetermine
as　such　the　possible　content　aRd　pessible　outcome　of　the　process．　They　do　so　by
investing　certain　policy　contents　with　increased　chances　of　being　implemented，　by
providing　certain　interests　with　a　head　start，　and　by　granting　them　chronological
priority，　relatively　more　favourable　coalition　chances　or　the　opportunity　to　employ
specific　power　resources．　Every　procedural　rule　creates　conditioRs　of　being　favoured，
or　conversely　being　exciuded，　for　certain　issues，　groups　or　interests．　This　is　what　is
meant　by　the　coRcept　of’non－decision　’．”
　　　　And　he　qoutes　Bachrach　and　Baratz’s　definition　；
　　“non－decision　making　is　a　means　by　which　demands　for　change　in　the　existing
allocation　of　benefits　and　privileges　in　the　community　can　be　suffocated　before　they
are　even　voiced；　or　kept　covert；　or　kiiled　before　they　gain　access　to　the　relevant
decision－making　arena　；　or　failiiag　all　these　things，　maimed　or　destroyed　in　the　deci一
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sion　implementing　stage　of　the　poiicy　processi5）”．
　　　The　final　stage　of創tering　issues　is　repression，　the　overt　use　of　police，　the　armed
forces　and　the　judiciary　to　restrict　the　scope　of　possible　political　events．
　　　The　concept　of　’　non－decision　making　’　has　been　criticized　again　fer　its　poorly
defined　subject　matter．　WheR　the　study　of　decisioninakiRg　includes　non－decisionmak－
ing　process，　the　scope　of　political　analysis　could　be　enhanced　to　the　degree　that
makes　it　dithcult　to　distinguish　political　process　from　the　entire　system　of　social
processes．　lt　is　also　diMcult　to　tell　potentially　significant　non－events　from　other
politically　dismissed　events．　The　authors　of　Power　and　Poverty　conducted　an　empiri－
cal　research　of　power　relationship　betweeR　black　and　white　people　in　Baltimore，　and
the　non－decisionmaking　process　by　examining　the　process　of　black　people　overcoming
the　barrier　created　by　socially　advaRtageous　white　people’s　non－decisioRmaking
power．　CreRson　did　a　comparative　research　on　two　towns，　which　faced　the　same　air
pollution　problem　but　demonstrated　different　reactions　to　it　；　by　coreparing　them，　he
disclosed　that　the　stronger　non－decisionmaking　power　was　at　work　in　one　town　than
the　otheri6）　．
　　　　Definition　of　potentially　significant　non－event　remains　unsettled　in　spite　of　the
efforts　of　these　scholars　to　explain　it　in　retrospective　or　comparative　terms．
　　　　Ik　this　paper，　we　will　try　yet　another　approach　to　study　non－decision　making，　by
focusing　the　already　controversial　issiae　of　nuclear　power　plant　construction　in　Japan．
It　is　aR　issue　over　which　plant－site　residents　and　administration　have　created　some－
times　violent　confiicts　；　of　which　the　Japanese　Socialist　Party　and　its　affiliated　unions
and　the　Japanese　Communist　Party　disapprove；　and　for　which　the　majority　of　the
public　expresses　opposition，　or　at　least，　uncertaiRty．　Nevertheless，　the　government
constantly　supports　the　nuclear　energy　development，　and　plant　coRstructions　have
been　encouraged．　For　the　past　several　years，　administration’s　advisory　body　has
gradually　set　down　the　prospect　for　the　future　energy　needs，　yet　dependence　on
nuclear　is　expected　to　be　higher．
　　　　The　gap　betweeR　the　public　fear　for　nuclear　energy　and　the　governrnent’s　con－
stant　endorsement　is　worth　looking　iRto　；　why　the　conflicting　opinioR　is　not　repre－
sented　and　the　seemingly　great　controversy　in　party　politics　remains　a　non－event　in
the　governmental　agenda．　The　mechanism　creating　this　gap　may　be　called　structural
selectiveness．　Our　hypothesis　is，　therefore，　that　nuclear　energy　policy　is　kept　intact，
despite　all　controversies，　from　the　public　counter　pressure　by　structural　selectiveness
of　JapaRese　political　system．
　　　　Due　to　the　limited　space，　and　to　the　importance　attached　to　Japanese　bureaucracy
in　the　pluralist　arguments　as　a　mediator　between　state　and　social　interest，　we　will
conceRtrate　our　analysis　on　examination　of　the　mechanism　of　filtering　issues　performed
in　bureaucratic　planning　and　administration；　how　the　plan　foy　nuclear　energy　is
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formulated　and　implemented　；　whose　interest　is　given　priority　by　fermal　procedural
structures　；　and　whose　interest　is　given　less　respect．　Although　it　is　expected　that
pattems　of　individual　planning　of　plant　constructien　fluctuate，　which　sheuld　be
analyzed　in　detail，　we　intend　here　to　see　the　general　features　applicable　to　many
cases．
IV．　Case　Study－Nuelear　Administratioft
IV．1．　Li¢ensing　Process－Procedural　Selectiveness
　　　　There　are　now　35　nuclear　power　plants　commercially　operating　in　Japan．　ln　the
history　of　nuclear　power　development，　there　has　been　no　plant　which　is　suspended　of
construceion　or　operation　for　reasons　other　than　malfunction．　An　official　of　the
Ministry　of　lnternational　Trade　aiid　lndustry　attribtes　the　untrottbled　progress　to　the
centralized　system　of　nuclear　administration，　compared　with　the　discentralized　system
of　the　U．S．’7）．　All　the　administrative　and　licensing　aathorities　over　nuclear　matters
fall　in　the　MITI’s　jurisdiction．　Electric　power　is　developed　and　provided　nationwide
by　9　（10　when　incltiding　Okinawa）　companies，　which　cover　different　areas　separately
in　an　uncompetitive　manner．　A　centralized　system　is　certainly　the　advantage　for　’
nuclear　erergy　promoters　；　it　means　fewer　numbers　of　participants　and　less　conflict
between　themi8）　．
　　　　Electric　power　companies　assume　responsibility　of　the　whole　process　of　nuclear
power　plant　project　from　site　selection，　land　purchase，　constructiolt　to　operation．
There　are，　however，　several　steps　that　cempanies　must　take　with　the　government　in
order　to　be　licensed．　The　government　actually　controls　the　overall　nuclear　power
project　by　holding　the　licensing　autbority．
　　　　When　aR　electric　power　cornpany　draws　a　plan　for　plant　construction，　the　plan
has　to　be　examined　against　the　Law　Concerning　Power－Resources　Development
whether　it　accords　with　the　policy　to　promote　balanced　development　and　uses　of
energy　seurces．　The　Council　of　Power－Resources　Develepment　and　CoQrdination
（Dengen　Kaihatsu　Ch6sel　Shinghikai，　Dench6shin）　discusses　the　plan　and　deterraines
whether　it　should　be　integrated　into　the　general　power－resources　development　plan　；
the　Council　consists　of　relevaRt　ministers　such　as　the　Prime　Minister，　the　Minister　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　’
ITI，　and　the　Director　of　Economic　PlanniBg　Agency，　and　people　from　the　academia，一
and　upoR　the　advice　of　this　cottncil，　the　Prime　Minister　makes　the　final　decisiolt．
Included　here　are　mostly　representatives　of　industrial　or　econornic　i就erest，　alld　little
of　relevant　local　or　ecological　interest．
　　　　Prior　to　the　Dench6shin　deliberatioit，　land　purchase，　negotiation　with　local
residents，　and　environmental　survey　must　be　all　completed　on　the　electric　power
company’s　responsibility；　it　i＄，　therefore，　usually　the　case　that　the　plan　is　almost
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automatically　admitted　into　the　general　plan　once　it　is　presented　te　the　DeRch6shin．
The　preliminary　negotiation　with　local　administratiens　and　relevant　organizations
are　carried　out　directly　by　the　electric　power　company，　or　sometimes　mediated　by
prefectural　or　city　administrators．　Local　authorities’　responsibilities　and　power　are
not　explicitly　defined　in　the　national　nuclear　administration　；　they　are　not　institution－
alized　participants　in　this　matter．
　　　　The　primary　public　hearing　is　held　at　this　stage　by　the　MITI　with　representa－
tives　from　plant－site　areas，　the　electric　power　company，　and　the　relevaRt　administra－
tive　agencies．
　　　　When　the　plaR　is　approved　with　regard　to　the　general　power－resources　develop－
ment　plan，　the　company　presents　the　blueprint　of　reactor　building　to　the　Minister　of
ITI，　which　has　almost　moRopoly　of　powers　over　the　nation’s　nuciear　power　program．
The　minister　then　exarnines　the　uses　of　the　power　plant，　safety　measures　and　struc－
tures　of　plant　facilities　and　such　；　he　delivers　license　when　he　deems　the　plan　qualified．
The　Atomic　Energy　Cornmission　（Genshiryoku　linkai　：　AEC）　and　the　Nuclear　Safety
Commission　（Genshiryoku　Anzen　linkai　：　NSC）　present　their　own　opinioRs　at　this
stage　and　the　minister　is　expected　to　respect　themi9＞．
　　　　The　Atomic　Energy　Commission　is　headed　by　the　Director　of　Science　and　Techno－
logy　Agency，　of　which　4　members　are　appointed　by　the　Prime　Minister　with　conseftt
of　the　commissien　chairman　and　the　Diet．　The　Commission　oversees　the　R　＆　D　of
nuclear　energy　；　it　had　almost　almighty　power　over　nuclear　research　when　the　project
was　still　at　R　＆　D　stage　ilt　the　1960’s．　lt　was　made　an　independent　body　directly
responsible　to　the　Prime　MiRister　so　that　it　could　perform　its　delegated　functions
without　being　iRterrupted　by　political　conflict．　When　ftuclear　power　reactors　became
commercially　viable　energy　source，　the　MITI　took　over　and　assumed　all　respoRsibil－
ities　and　powers　over　nuclear　matters，　dwarfing　the　Commission’s　power．
　　　The　Nttclear　Safety　Commission　is　another　independent　body　to　check　matters
cencerning　safety　measures　of　power　reactors，　plant　facilities　and　fuel　transportation．
It　also　examines　safety　reports　presented　by　relevant　administrators　when　requested
（dabura　cheleku　：　the　double－checking　system）．　Specific　problems　are　dealt　with　by
attached　councils．　However，　the　Commission　is　understaffed，　unprovided　with　inde－
pendent　facilities，　and　given　only　an　advisory　role．　lts　exarr｝iRation　tends　to　be　done
only　in　papers，　and　since　reports　are　made　by　the　MITI，　the　Commission　is　vulnerable
to　the　MITI　control．　These　two　co！nmissiens　are　advisory　bodies　directly　responsible
to　the　Prime　Minister，　and　little　interested　in　representing　confiicting　opinions
to　the　national　policy．
　　　The　second　public　hearing　is　held　by　the　NSC　at　this　stage．　Public　hearing　（k6kai
hiaringu）　started　in　1979，　replacing　the　previous　hearing　（k6ch6kai）　system．
　　　Once　the　Prime　Minister　approves，　the　rest　ef　the　administrative　responsibility
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is　left　with　the　MITI．　During　the　construction　process，　the　electric　power　company
must　acquire　at　least　7　approvals　from　the　MITI，　concerning　reactor　design，　fuel
loading，　and　safety　regulation．　lnspections　are　carried　out　thus　continuously　until
a　reactor　starts　to　operate．　The　MITI　inspects　a　reactor　and　plant　facilities　regularly
during　the　operation，　aitd　retains　power　to　suspend　the　operation　if　necessary．
　　　Although　inspections　are　thus　frequent　and　continueus，　they　are　done　by　the
MITI，　the　major　prorrioter　of　Japanese　nuclear　energy．　The　lack　of　an　independent
inspector　raises　questions　about　neutrality　of　investigation．　Antinuclear　groups’
suspicious　attitude　toward　inspection　specifically，　and　toward　information　provided
by　nuclear　energy　promoters　in　general，　may　be　attributed　to　the　partial　nuclear
administration，　in　which　few　neutral　parties　are　involved．
Public　Hearing　：　An　Opportunity　for　Antinuclear　Groups’　Direct　lnvolvement
　　　Two　public　heraings　are　required　by　law　to　discuss　desirability　and　safety　of　a
nuclear　power　plant　with　plant－site　residents．　They　must　be　held　at　different　ecca－
sioRs　during　the　licensing　process：the　first　by　the　MITI　before　the　Dench6shin
deliberation，　and　the　second　by　the　NSC　before　the　MITI’s　approval　for　constructioR．
In　addition　to　these　hearings，　the　electric　power　company　reports　an　environmeRtal
assessment　to　plant－site　residents　before　nominatiitg　the　site　to　the　MITI．　Although
residents　are　free　te　examine　the　report，　it　is　up　to　the　company　whether　residents’
opinions　are　included　in　the　report　that　is　evaluated　by　the　Thermal　Power　Division
of　the　MITI’s　EBergy　Resource　Agency．　The　assessment　repert，　therefere，　does　net
seem　to　provide　aR　opportunity　for　public　participation．
　　　The　primary　hearing　is　designed　to　give　an　opportunity　for　constructors　to
explain　a　plan　to　those　who　are　affected　and　for　the　affected　to　present　their　questions
and　opinions，　with　emphasis　on　the　former　function．　The　first　primary　hearing　was
held　in　Niigata　i捻December　1980　f6r　the　second　aRd　the鉦th　reactors　of　Kashiwazaki／
Kariwa　plant：nine　such　hearings　have　been　held　ever　since．　lt　was　the　subject　of
political　confiict　from　the　beginning　；　antinuclear　groups，　which　had　advocated　for　a
mandatory　hearing　when　it　had　not　been　required，　were　against　it．　ln　Kashiwazaki，
antinuclear　groups　demanded　what　they　called　an　’open　debate’，　denouncing　the
MITI－spoRsored　hearing　as　“　a　mere　ceremony　fer　advancing　steps　for　construction20）”．
　　　ABtiRuclear　greups’　dissent　is　not　unjustified．　Apart　frem　the　fact　that　the　MITI－
sponsored　hearing　was　far　from　their　idea　of　public　heariRg，　which　included　the
referendum，　the　hearing　procedure　seems　too　limited　to　claim　itself　a　’　public　’　hear－
ing．　Hearing　is　scheduled　to　be　held　for　one　day　regardless　of　numbers　of　reacters　in
question　and　numbers　of　affected　rnunicipalities．　lt　is　to　be　announced　6　weeks　in
advance；　relevant　documents　are　available　through　a　branch　othce　of　the　electric
power　company　during　these　weeks．　WheR　antinuclear　groups　regard　documents
insuMcient，　they　may　demand　additional　information　to　be　supplied．
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　　　　In　the　case　of　the　primary　hearing　for　the　third　and　the　fourth　reactors　of　the
Genkai　plant　in　Saga　prefecture，　antinuclear　groups　found　that　supplied　documents
inadequate　；　the　environmental　assessment　report　made　earlier　did　not　consider　effects
of　the　second　reactor　which　started　operation　after　the　assessment　was　made．
Sixty　member　of　several　antinuclear　groups　protested　directly　to　the　Atomic　Pewer
Division　of　the　Energy　Resources　Agency，　demanding　that　the　assessment　be　up－
dated　；　that　the　hearing　be　suspended　until　the　municipal　scandal　over　the　issue　of
grants　given　to　Genkai　town　is　investigated　；　that　the　installment　of　two　reactors　be
cancelled　in　consideration　of　sluggish　electricity　dernand．
　　　The　MITI　responded　to　these　requests　uncooperatively．　As　to　the　first　request，
the　MITI　insisted　that　“　the　environmental　assessment　report　is　not　a　required　docu－
ment　for　the　hearing．　Leaflets　provided　by　the　electric　power　company　are　sufficient
for　discussion　at　the　hearing2i）”．　lt　ignored　the　other　two　requests，　saying　that
they　waRted　te　hold　the　hearing　as　soon　as　possible　although　the　date　was　still　unde－
termiRed．　The　hearing　took　place　in　July　16，　1982．
　　　The　secondary　hearing　is　held　by　the　NSC　；　its　purpose　is　defined　as　“　absolving
opinions　of　plant－site　residents　on　safety　matters　so　that　they　are　considered　（san－
shakusuru）　in　the　NSC’s　evaluation　of　the　MITI　safety　report22）”．　lt　states　that　it　is
desirable　that　both　pro－and　anti－nuclear　residents　should　be　present　in　the　hearing　to
discuss　safety　of　nuclear　power．
　　　The　hearing，　however，　has　not　been　without　problems．　Just　like　the　primary
heariRgs，　the　secondary　one　started　with　epposition　by　antinuclear　act（vists．　The
first　secondary　hearing　took　place　in　Takahama　in　Fukui　prefecture　in　January　1980
with　the　MITI　as　an　explaining　party．　Antinuc！ear　groups　started　the　campaigR　at
the　NSC’s　announcement　of　holding　a　hearing．　Their　coRcern　was　over　the　fairness　of
the　procedure．　Antinuclear　groups　maintained　that　the　proposed　hearing　was　teo
exclusioRary，　limiting　the　numbers　of　petitioners　to　12　people　and　each　petitioner’s
statement　to　within　10　minutes．　The　procedure　also　prehibited　requestioning．　Con－
demning　the　hearing　with　such　regulations　’　deception　’，　aRtinuclear　groups　refused
to　participate，　and　held　demonstrations　outside　the　building　where　the　hearing　was
he！d．
　　　IR　may　1983，　the　NSC　held　the　secondary　hearing　for　censtruction　of　the　second
reactor　of　the　Shirnane　plant．　The　Shimane　Conference　of　Greups　opposiRg　Nuclear
Power　Plant　（ShimaRe　Genpatsu　K6gai　Taisaku　Kaighi）　decided，　for　the　first　time　as
any　antiRuclear　group，　to　participate　in　the　hearing，　although　their　decision　invited
criticisms　even　from　within　the　antinuclear　forces　as　compromising　the　campaign23）．
The　hearing　turned　into　a　turmoil　as　antinuclear　petitioners　pressed　on　the　MITI　and
the　NSC　officials．　When　the　twe－day　hearing　was　over，　the　Shimane　groups　declared
their　victory　for　revealing　the　deceptive　attitude　of　nuclear　promoters　and　forcing
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them　to　“admit　their　inability　to　answer　the　questions2‘）”．　The　second　reactor　is
being　under　construction　as　of　August　1986，　in　spite　of　the　strong　opposition　ex－
pressed　in　the　hearing．
　　　　Putting　aside　the　specific　effects　on　nuclear　power　plant　construction，　which
may　vary　from　none　to　delay　in　process　or　suspension，　the　hearing　has　served　little
for　communication　between　pro－and　anti－nuclear　groups．　Antinuclear　groups，　as
mentioned　above，　do　not　regard　it　as　an　opportunity　to　register　their　dissent　over　the
policy，　but　make　it　a　target　of　antinuclear　campaigR．　Government　officials　consider
it　a　necessary　but　troublesome　step　that　has　to　be　taken　in　order　to　proceed　with　the
construction　plan．　They　need　as　little　trouble　as　possible　in　procedure　；　ik　1981，　the
law　was　revised　for　the　primary　hearing　to　allow　questioning　in　letters　to　substitute
the　public　hearing　so　that　troubles　with　local　residents　should　be　avoided．　The　role
of　the　hearing　thus　has　been　weakened，　making　the　almost　only　opportunity　for
direct　public　participatien　in　the　policy　fermulation，　process　inte　a　closed　channel，　by
which　antinuclear　groups　are　kept　from　becoming　a　legitimate　political　force．
IV．2．　Grant　一　SwitchiRg　of　the　lss“e　froma　Nucleay　Energy　to　Regiona｝　Peveloment
（a）　Financing　of　Nuclear　Energy　Development
　　　　When　Japanese　nuclear　development　reached　the　stage　of　construction　of　power
reactors　and　their　commercial　operation，　the　existing　legal　system　became　insufficient．
Necessary　legal　framewerk　was　prepared　in　the　1960’s　through　the　early　1970’s；
relevant　iegislations　now　count　approximately　to　40．　They　are　divided　into　six
categories　accerding　te　jurisdiction．　The　first　is　the　Basic　Atom　Law　of　1956，　which
defines　the　purpose　of　Japanese　nuclear　energy　research　and　development．　The
second　group　includes　laws　to　create　the　Atomic　Energy　Coramission　o£　Japan，　the
Nuclear　Safety　Commission　of　Japan，　the　Agency　of　Science　and　TechnQlogy　and
such，　instituting　the　national　nuclear　energy　administration．　The　third　group　con－
sists　of　laws　creating　the　R　＆　D　organizations　such　as　the　Research　lnstitute　of　Atomic
Energy　（NihoR　Genshiryoku　KenkyUjo，　Genken），　and　the　Power　Reactor　aRd　．Nuclear
Fuel　Development　Corp．　（Dbryokure，　Kakuneltryb　Kaihatsu　Jigybdan，　D6nen）．
　　　The　fourth　category　concerns　the　safety　regulation　of　nuclear　power；　laws　to
regulate　reactors　and　nuclear　materials　and　fuel　are　collectively　known　as　the　Regula－
tory　Laws　of　Reactors　and　Such　（Genshiroto　kiseihd）．　The　fifth，　group　of　another
regulatory　legislation　designtd　te　prevent　radiation　leak　and　exposure．　And　the　last
group　is　purported　to　encourage　both　builders　and　local　residekts　to　cooperate　in
plant　construction．　The　LavsT　Cencerning　Tax　for　Promotion　of　Power－Resources
Developrnent　（Dengen　kaihatsu　sokushinzei－h6），　the　Law　Concerning　Special　Account
for　Prornotion　of　Power－Resources　Development　（Dengen　kaihatsu　sokushin－taisaku
tokubetsu　kaikei－hO），　and　the　Law　Concerning　Development　of　Area　around　Power
Public　Participation　：　Patterns　and　Political　Environment77
Plant　（Hatsuden’y6　shisetsu　shuhenchiiki　seibi－hO），　collectively　known　as　three　laws
concerning　promotion　of　power－resources　development　（Dengen　3－po）　are　the　main
components　of　this　group．
　　　　The　last　group　of　laws　established　in　1974，　as　their　titles　suggest，　are　to　contri－
bute　to　increasing　numbers　and　variety　of　power－resources，　covering　all　possible
sources　：　hydroelectric　power，　thermal　power，　solar　power，　nuclear　power，・・・…etc．
The　laws，　however，　seem　to　have　served　development　of　nuclear　power　particularly
well，　in　spite　of　the　general　nature　in　their　provisions．
　　　　The　laws　work　in　combination　as　follows　；　（1）　the　governrr｝ent　collects　tax　for
promotion　of　power－resources　development　from　electric　power　companies，　based　on
the　sales　amount　ef　electric　power　（Dengen　kaihatsu　sokushinzei－h6）　；　（2）　the　govern－
ment　establishes　the　special　account　for　promotion　of　power－resources　development
with　the　above　revenue　（Dengen　kaihatsu　sokushin－taisaku　tokubetsu　kaikei－h6）　；　（3）
then，　frorn　this　account，　the　government　appropriates　money　for　constructioR　and
repair　of　public　facilities　in　a　plant－site　area，　and　for　grants　to　a　local　governmental
authority　in　return　for　accepting　a　power　plant　（Hatsuden’y6　shisetsu　chiiki　seibi－ho）．
　　　　Nuclear　power　is　the　beneficiary　of　this　system；　the　construction　of　nuclear
power　piant　is　entitled　not　only　to　the　grants　under　the　seibi－h6，　but　also　to　money
from　the　budget　for　nuclear　safety　measure　also　appropyiated　from　the　above　special
budget．　The　budget　is　allocated　to　experiment　on　plant’s　safety　measure，　radiation
moRitering，　investigation　of　infiuence　of　heated　water，　and　public　information　and
safety　services．
　　　　In　1986，　the　spending　specifically　designated　to　nuclear　power　plants　holds　220／o
of　the　Power　Plant　Location　Account　under　the　Special　Account．　（lt　does　not　include
spending　under　the　general　grants　for　promotion　of　power－resources　development．）
Another　sub－account　in　the　Special　Account　is　called　the　Power－Resources　Diversifica－
tion　Accounts，　of　which　nuclear　developinent　spending　amounts　to　630／o．　ln　total，
nuclear　alone　spent　480／o　of　the　Special　Account　for　Promotion　of　Power－Resources
Development25）．　Considering　that　the　MITI　and　the　Agency　of　Science　and　Techno－
logy　have　their　own　accounts　for　nuclear　development　and　nuclear　fuel　expenses，
nuclear　eRergy　development　is　given　prierity　in　Japanese　energy　developfnent．
（b）　Nuclear　Pewer　Plants　aRd　Regienal　Economy
　　　　Plant－site　municipalities　receive　two　kinds　of　governmental　subsidy　at　the　start
of　construction：grants　for　promotion　of　pewer　plant　location　and　grants　for　area
around　nuclear　power　plants．　The　first　grants　are　awarded　for　about　ten　years　from
the　beginning　of　construction　until　five　years　after　the　operation．　Uses　of　grants　are
limited　to　coRstructioR　of　public　facilities　such　as　roads，　ports，　parks，　public　gymna－
sium　or　educational　facilities　；　if　grants　are　spent　on　enterprises　financed　by　other
governmental　subsidy，　the　same　amount　as　the　grants　spent　oR　it　is　to　be　deducted
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from　the　subsidy．　lt　is　allowed　from　1979　to　appropriate　IOO／o　of　the　grants　to
maintenance　of　these　facilities．
　　　　The　grants　help　little　of　the　general　development　of　regional　economy．　Grants
for　area　around　Ruclear　power　plant　（Genshiryoku　hatsuden　shisetsu－tb　shthhen　chiiki
kOfukin）　were　created　in　1981　at　the　request　of　plant－site　municipalities，　which
demanded　stable　employment　opportuRity　for　residents．　Electric　power　in　plant－site
area　is　partly　paid　with　the　grants，　lowering　the　rate　of　charge　；　cheap　electricity
may　be　attractive　to　outside　industries．　The　gr3nts　may　be　used　directly　on　enter－
prises　to　modernize　provincial　industries　and　on　expenses　for　inviting　outside　indus－
tries．
　　　　BeRefits　frem　these　grants，　however，　seem　to　have　been　limited　so　far　；　few　other
industries　have　come　to　plant－site　towns，　and　local　authorities　are　left　with　a　need
for　a　greater　amount　of　money　to　maintain　new　facilities　when　the　grants　are　gone，
Considering　such　limited　benefits　for　plant－site　areas，　the　grants　may　only　increase
the　burden　oR　local　finance　in　the　long　run．　This　increasing　burden　weuld，　and
already　have　in　sorae　areas，　lead　plaRt－site　municipalities　to　invite　the　second　and
the　third　reactors，　in　order　te　maintain　the　level　of　local　revenue　swollen　by　the　past
grants．
　　　　Nuclear　administration　iR　JapaR　is　so　structured　as　to　promote　nuclear　energy，
aRd　to　exclude　antinuclear　pressure　as　much　as　possible．　Selective　licensing　procedure
minimizes　the　impact　of　antinuclear　pressure；　the　preferable　treatment　of　nuclear　in
budget　matters　tend　to　benefit　pro－nuclear　groups，　tnotivatifig　them　to　stronger
commitment．
　　　　Antinmclear　groups　are　selected　out　of　nuclear　policymakiltg　community　by　the
pro－nuclear　administrative　and　legal　structures．　Vague　fear　expressed　in　public　opin－
ion　surveys　remains　amoRg　people　without　being　translated　into　pelitical　support　for
aRti－nuclear　campaign，　because　antinuclear　opinion　is　not　represented　in　political
discussions　as　an　alternative．
V．　Structural　Selectiveness　and　Patterns　ef　Public　Participation
　　　Being　selected　out　of　the　legitimate　nuclear　policy　dlscussions，　Japanese　antinuclear
groups　have　resorted　to　a　means　of　resistance　which　is　most　effective　iR　producing
immediate　results　；　refusing　to　compromise　fishing　rights　and　land　ownership．　ln　the
history　of　Japanese　antinuclear　movement，　various　means　of　resistance　have　been
tried　：　demonstration　to　oppose　hearings，　petition，　litigation，　and　election　of　anti－
nuclear　candidates　to　local　councils．　However，　the　effectiveness　of　these　means　were
limited．　Hearings　are，　as　explained　earlier，　do　not　serve　as　an　opportunity　to　register
their　dissent　；　petition　does　not　have　legally　binding　power　；　litigation　takes　so　long
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a　time　to　get　a　result，　and　does　not　suspend　construction　while　the　case　is　discussed
in　court；aRd　elected　represebtatives　are　too　small　in　number　to　be　a　political　force．
Cooperation　with　oppos圭tion　parties　has　been　conti撫ed，　but　without　much　success．
All　these　factors　are　to　be　examined　in　detail　in　another　occasion．
　　　　While　trying　all　these　available　means　and　exchanging　information　with　people
in　other　plant－site　regions，　antinu！clear　activists　learned　that　once　the　construction
starts，　there　is　few　things　left　for　them　to　do　to　stop　it，　aRd　that　the　most　effective
means　of　opposition　is　prevention，　not　allowing　it　to　s‘Lart．　Since　electric　power　com－
panies　mttst　complete　land　purchase　and　negotiation　with　fishermen’s　organizations
before　applying　for　license，　land　ownership　aRd　fishing　rights　are　important　resources
of　resistance　for　antinuclear　groups．　Antinuclear　activists　then　eRcouraged　local
groups　to　adopt　the　tactics　and　it　certainly　succeeded　in　some　nominated　towns，　such
as　Namie　in　Fukushima　prefecture，　Maki　in　Niigata，　and　Shiga　in　lshikawa．
　　　　Relying　on　this　tactics，　antinuclear　groups’　success　began　to　depend　more　and
more　upon　individual　landowners’　or　fishermen’s　persistence　；　the　tactics　has　also　led
the　issue　to　look　like　a　confiict　between　industrial　developers　and　local　re．srdents．
The　grants　given　for　regional　development　has　made　the　impression　strong；　the
resistance　was　sometimes　overcome　by　increased　amount　of　grants．　As　the　issue　has
been　perceived　increasingly　as　a　local　concern　to　be　settled　between　the　direct　par－
ticipants，　nationwide　coordination　of　local　activities，　although　still　imperative　for
continuing　campaign，　has　assumed　less　importance　than　individual　local　efforts．　lt
is　admittedly　better　to　win　wherever　they　can，　and　a　success　in　some　area　certainly
encourages　efforts　of　landewners　and　fishermen　in　other　areas．
　　　　However，　less　demaRd　for　nationwide　campaign　tends　to　localize　the　issue　and　to
fragment　the　movement．　Local　groups　do　not　depend　much　on　outside　support　except
for　moral　one　because　the　chosen　tactics　does　not　require　it；　outsiders，　even　con－
cerned　with　the　issue，　do　not　associate　the　local　problem　with　their　vague　fear　for
nuclear　energy　in　general．　The　gap　between　the　public　fear　and　plant－site　residents’
efforts　can　be，　at　least　partially，　attributed　to　the　tactical　choice．
　　　　Structural　selectiveness　thus　affects　the　pattem　of　public　participation　by　limit－
ing　the　tactical　choice　for　groups　selected　eut　from　the　legitimate　political　discus－
sions．　ln　the　case　of　Japanese　antinuclear　movement，　the　successful　dismissal　of
antinuclear　opinion　from　the　political　process　forced　antinuclear　groups　to　adopt　the
most　effective　tactics　that　is　allovv’ed　to　them　：　land　ownership　and　fishing　rights．
The　tactics，　however，　localizes　the　issue　by　stressing　local　efforts，　and　makes　it　diM－
cult　to　place　the　antinuclear　opinion　on　natienal　political　agenda．　Structural　selec－
tiveness　performed　in　Japanese　nuclear　administration　has　exerted　suMcient　’　non－
decision　making　power’　to　keep　the　issue　from　becoming　a　political　controversy．
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